Is yelling in the workplace harassment

 

Before the court for review was a recommendation from the Review Department of the State Bar Court (California) that petitioner attorney be disbarred for numerous counts of client-related misconduct. Petitioner claimed that state bar lacked jurisdiction and that the disciplinary proceedings were void under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 et seq., and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961 et seq.

 

Overview: Is yelling in the workplace harassment?

 

 

Petitioner attorney sought review of a recommendation from the Review Department of the State Bar Court (Department) that petitioner attorney be disbarred. Petitioner was found culpable in nine counts of misconduct involving forty separate acts of such misconduct as commingling client funds, concealing assets, engaging in disruptive and offensive courtroom-conduct, and making frivolous motions to disqualify judges. The court adopted the Department's recommendation and ordered petitioner's disbarment. The court rejected petitioner's claims that the disciplinary proceedings violated Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Act), 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 et seq., and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961 et seq. The court ruled that the Act was inapplicable to the state disciplinary action and that there was no persuasive evidence of any racketeering activity on the part of the state bar in disciplining her. The court rejected as meritless petitioner's claim that discipline imposed by the integrated bar was an unconstitutional violation of associational or free speech rights.

 

 

 

The court adopted the recommendation of the Review Department of the State Bar Court and ordered that petitioner attorney be disbarred. The federal Sherman Antitrust Act was inapplicable to the state's disciplinary action; there was no persuasive evidence of any racketeering activity on the part of the state bar in disciplining her. There was no constitutional infirmity regarding the establishment of or procedures used by the state bar.

 

 

 

 

Plaintiff patient and defendant hospital in medical malpractice action each appealed the order of the California Court of Appeal reversing the trial court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiff and affirming its award of periodic payments to plaintiff under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 667.7 and Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2, enacted as part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act.

 

 

 

Plaintiff patient brought a malpractice suit against defendant hospital for injuries he suffered at his birth. The court reversed the lower court's affirmation of the trial court's award of periodic payments to plaintiff pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 667.7 and Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2, parts of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), and remanded the case to the trial court to recalculate the award. It found that although the trial court was required to place a cap on the future damages the jury awarded plaintiff, it erred in calculating the award because plaintiff was entitled to periodic payment of future noneconomic damages that totalled the equivalent of a lump-sum award The court also found that the trial court erred in disregarding the jury's calculation of future economic damages because the jury was expressly required to decide the matter. It rejected plaintiff's argument that the trial court acted arbitrarily in extending the periodic payments over his lifetime, finding that it was not unreasonable for it to conclude that he would suffer lifetime losses. The court affirmed the denial of attorney fees to plaintiff, noting that MICRA did not provide for them.

 

 

 

The court reversed the lower court's affirmation of the trial court's award of periodic payments to plaintiff patient in medical malpractice action against defendant hospital, finding that the payments had been incorrectly calculated and remanding the award to the trial court for a proper calculation. It affirmed the lower court's denial of attorney fees to plaintiff, finding that they were not statutorily authorized.